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NOTE
DE-FRAUDING THE SYSTEM:
SHAM PLAINTIFFS AND THE FRAUDULENT
JOINDER DOCTRINE
Matthew C. Monahan*
Playing off the strict requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction, plain-
tiffs can structure their suits to prevent removal to federal court. A
common way to preclude removability is to join a nondiverse party. Alt-
hough plaintiffs have a great deal offlexibility, they may include only those
parties that have a stake in the lawsuit. Put another way, a court will not
permit a plaintiff to join a party to a lawsuit when that party is being
joined solely to prevent removal. The most useful tool federal courts em-
ploy to prevent this form of jurisdictional manipulation is Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 21. Rule 21 permits a federal court to drop a joined party
if that party fails the permissive joinder rules of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 20. Federal courts have an additional tool to scrutinize joined
defendants: the fraudulent joinder doctrine. The doctrine permits a federal
court to look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the
plaintiff has a colorable claim against the nondiverse defendant. If not, the
court ignores this diversity-destroying defendant and the suit remains in
federal court. Ultimately, federal courts use this robust tool only to scruti-
nize the joinder of defendants, leaving some plaintiff-based manipulation
unchecked. This Note argues that federal courts should correct this defi-
ciency and extend the fraudulent joinder doctrine to police sham plaintiffs.
Extending the doctrine in this manner would prevent jurisdictional
gamesmanship, provide defendants with a fair opportunity to remove to a
neutral forum, and supply clear standards for courts to deploy in scrutiniz-
ing the joinder of sham plaintiffs.
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INTRODUCTION
A plaintiff is the master of her complaint.' By initiating the lawsuit, the
plaintiff shapes the scope of the litigation by selecting the forum, the venue,
the timing of the litigation, and the parties involved.' Choosing between
federal and state court is among the most important decisions a plaintiff
makes. 3 Despite the deference that courts afford to a plaintiff's choice of
forum,4 a defendant retains the right to remove the suit to federal court if it
could have been brought there initially.5
Conventional wisdom suggests that plaintiffs prefer to litigate in state
court.6 Empirical studies, however, have not shown a clear pro-plaintiff bias
in state courts. But they have shown that plaintiffs suffer a significant drop
1. 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & JOAN E.
STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter 14B
WRIGHT & MILLER].
2. JERRY M. CUSTIS, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK § 8.3 (1996 & Supp.
2010).
3. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (noting that, in the context
of forum non conveniens, "the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed"); I LITI-
GATING TORT CASES § 3:2 (Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano eds., 2008).
4. 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 577 (2003).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006). A defendant may remove based on, among other things,
federal question jurisdiction, id. § 1331, or diversity jurisdiction, id. § 1332.
6. See Paul Rosenthal, Improper Joinder: Confronting Plaintiffs' Attempts to Destroy
Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 49, 50 (2009). A plaintiff may prefer
to litigate in state court because of the benefits defendants receive in federal court. Some tacti-
cal and practical reasons for defendants' preference for federal court include the increased
availability of summary judgment, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986), the
possibility of separating the trial into liability and damages phases, see FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b),
the increased role of the federal judge in the scheduling process, see FED. R. Civ. P. 16, and
federal evidentiary laws that may be more favorable to defendants. Thomas A. Mauet, The
New World of Experts in Federal and State Courts, 25 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 223, 234-35
(2001).
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in win rates after removal.' At the very least then, plaintiffs have an incen-
tive to ensure that their state-court suits stay in state court.
Because of the strict requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction, a
plaintiff has a number of legitimate tools to prevent removal.8 A federal
court may exercise diversity jurisdiction only when there is complete diver-
sity between the parties and where there is an amount in controversy greater
than $75,000.9 A common way to prevent removal is to join a nondiverse
party. On the defendant side, a plaintiff can either sue a nondiverse defend-
ant 10 or file suit in a defendant's home state." On the plaintiff side, a
plaintiff may also join with another plaintiff to sue a common defendant.'
When the other plaintiff shares a state of residency with the defendant, this
nondiverse plaintiff destroys complete diversity and precludes the suit's re-
movability. The flexibility to join with another plaintiff is subject to the
same legitimate cause-of-action standard that applies to the joinder of de-
fendants.
Sometimes, plaintiffs go beyond their permitted discretion and join non-
diverse parties who lack a stake in the suit. These parties, which I call sham
parties, do not contribute to the adjudication of the case; rather, they are
joined solely to prevent removal. Sham parties impermissibly manipulate
jurisdiction by depriving defendants of their statutory right of removal.
Courts use a number of tools to prevent this jurisdictional manipulation.
By far, the strongest tool to scrutinize party joinder is Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 21. Under Rule 21, a federal court may sever dispensable, non-
diverse parties to preserve diversity jurisdiction in select situations. 3 But
Rule 21 is an incomplete tool. First, Rule 21 severability is discretionary:
even in situations where improper joinder occurs, it is still up to the court to
determine whether to sever the parties or permit the suit to continue. Sec-
ondly and more importantly, most courts look only to the plaintiff's
complaint to determine whether severability is warranted.
7. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything about the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
581, 593 (1998) (finding that, after controlling for other variables such as case selection, re-
moval to federal court decreased plaintiffs' chances of winning by roughly one-fifth).
8. While plaintiffs have multiple tools to prevent removal under the theory of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, this Note focuses solely on jurisdictional manipulation in diversity
cases.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
10. This can be accomplished by joining with a plaintiff who is from the same state as
the defendant or by suing a defendant who is from the same state as a plaintiff. This destroys
complete diversity; thus, the action is not removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The
party who prevents complete diversity is called the diversity-destroying or nondiverse party.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) ("Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.").
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 21; Tab Express Int'l, Inc. v. Aviation Simulation Tech., Inc.,
215 F.R.D. 621, 623 (D. Kan. 2003) ("Courts may order a Rule 21 severance when it will
serve the ends of justice and further the prompt and efficient disposition of litigation.").
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There is a complement to Rule 21 that does not suffer its infirmities: the
fraudulent joinder doctrine. This doctrine permits a federal court to ignore
the presence of a diversity-destroying defendant if the plaintiff has no legit-
imate cause of action against the defendant.1 4 Unlike Rule 21, a court
finding fraudulent joinder ignores the diversity-destroying party and is per-
mitted to pierce the pleadings to determine whether that party has a stake in
the suit.' 5 In combination, Rule 21 and the fraudulent joinder doctrine cover
most instances of jurisdictional manipulation by way of suing sham defend-
ants. But because the doctrine of fraudulent joinder historically applies only
to the joinder of defendants, 6 some unfair deprivation of removal rights
goes unchecked when a plaintiff joins with sham plaintiffs.
The lack of a consistently applied fraudulent joinder doctrine for plain-
tiffs is troubling. Although Rule 21 could arguably police all instances of
unfair jurisdiction manipulation by plaintiffs, the rule's discretionary na-
ture 7 and lack of clear standards' 8 make it an incomplete tool. Extending
the fraudulent joinder doctrine would remedy this problem because it would
provide defendants with a clear standard to prove the existence of a sham
plaintiff,' 9 and it would permit a federal court to go beyond the face of the
complaint to determine whether the plaintiff has been fraudulently joined.'
Moreover, if the conditions of fraudulent joinder have been satisfied, the
court would then be obligated to ignore the diversity-destroying plaintiff.
14. See James M. Underwood, From Proxy to Principle: Fraudulent Joinder Reconsid-
ered, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1035 (2006) (describing fraudulent joinder as "a court-created
exception to the complete diversity requirement"); see also id. at 1037 ("[A] defendant named
to defeat removal and against whom the plaintiff has no 'possible' claim can be ignored in
terms of analyzing the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction.").
15. See infra Section II.A.2.
16. E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 569, 606 (2006) ("The traditional fraudulent joinder
doctrine is typically applied in cases where the removing diverse defendant accuses the plain-
tiff of fraudulently joining a non-diverse defendant.").
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("[T]he court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a
party. The court may also sever any claim against a party." (emphasis added)); see also Batton
v. Ga. Gulf, 261 F. Supp. 2d 575, 584 n.17 (M.D. La. 2003) ("Recourse to Rule 21 severance
is discretionary." (citing United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 368 (5th Cir. 1983))).
18. While most commentators agree that a federal court utilizing a Rule 21 analysis can
pierce the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff has fraudulently joined other plaintiffs,
it is still subject to the discretion of the court. See 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER & JOAN E. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3734 (4th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter 14C WRIGHT & MILLER].
19. While there is some disagreement among circuits as to the standard used in deter-
mining whether the plaintiff has a legitimate claim against the defendant, most courts agree
that it is some variant of the "no possibility of recovery under state law" standard. See Mat-
thew J. Richardson, Clarifying and Limiting Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. REV. 119, 146-47
(2006); see also infra Section II.B.
20. The majority of circuits agree that at least some evidence beyond the pleadings can
be introduced. Richardson, supra note 19, at 136-44; see also Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R.,
385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that judges pierce the pleadings in some circum-
stances).
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Extending the fraudulent joinder doctrine to cover sham plaintiffs would
not impose new obligations on plaintiffs. Rather, it would turn a "may" into
a "must": while improper joinder may lead to severance, fraudulent joinder
must lead to severance. The doctrine would only eliminate a diversity-
destroying plaintiff if the plaintiff pleaded false jurisdictional facts or if
some outside factor estopped the plaintiff from joining the suit.2' These
outside factors are likely to go unnoticed under Rule 21 but could easily be
detected in a fraudulent joinder analysis.
This Note argues that the traditional fraudulent joinder doctrine should
be extended to permit federal courts to ignore diversity-destroying plaintiffs
in select situations. Part I reviews diversity jurisdiction and removal general-
ly, with special attention paid to the balancing of a plaintiff's interest in
choosing the forum with the defendant's right of removal. Part II analyzes
the way federal courts use Rule 21 and the fraudulent joinder doctrine in an
attempt to prevent jurisdictional manipulation and concludes that the present
tools do not provide robust enough protection. Part III contends that federal
courts should apply the fraudulent joinder doctrine to plaintiffs in three cir-
cumstances: first, when the diversity-destroying plaintiff pleads false
jurisdictional facts; second, when the defendant and diversity-destroying
plaintiff are parties to a mandatory forum selection clause; and third, when
the diversity-destroying plaintiff's cause of action is precluded because of
an expired statute of limitations.
I. COMPETING RIGHTS TO FORUM SELECTION
Techniques to defeat removal work because federal diversity jurisdiction
extends only to cases where the parties are completely diverse. Section L.A
discusses the requirements of diversity jurisdiction and removal. Section I.B
traces the conflict between permitting the plaintiff to choose the forum and
the defendant's right of removal.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction and Removal
The Constitution authorizes federal courts to hear cases "between
[c]itizens of different [s]tates."22 Read literally, this grant of jurisdiction ap-
plies only to cases originally filed in federal court. However, Congress, with
the Judiciary Act of 1789, gave defendants the right to remove a case to fed-
eral court.23 The Supreme Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee24 upheld the
constitutionality of removal jurisdiction, finding that removal is implied by
21. See infra Section III.A.
22. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 1.
23. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80.
24. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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the Constitution's express grant of federal jurisdiction over particular sub-
ject matter.
Today, a defendant may remove to federal court if the state court action
falls under the original subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 26
Removal is permitted under federal question27 or diversity jurisdiction, 2
among other sources of federal subject matter jurisdiction. The federal di-
versity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, grants federal courts original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between
... citizens of different States. '29 Because diversity jurisdiction deprives a
state court of the chance to adjudicate a lawsuit implicating state law, feder-
al courts strictly construe the diversity statute.30 And because removal in
diversity cases is based on an underlying grant of federal diversity jurisdic-
tion, the removal statute is also strictly construed: "Not only does the
language of the [removal statute] evidence the Congressional purpose to
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal, but the policy of the
successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal courts is
one calling for the strict construction of such legislation.
31
Removal based on diversity jurisdiction is subject to a further limitation:
the statute prohibits removal where an in-state defendant has been properly
joined and served.3
25. Martin, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 349 ("This power of removal is not to be found in
express terms in any part of the constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a
power necessary and proper to carry into effect some express power.").
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) ("[Alny civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defend-
ant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place where such action is pending.").
27. See generally 14B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3722. A defendant may
remove a case if it satisfies the federal question jurisdiction requirements: "Any civil action of
which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under
the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the
citizenship or residence of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(b).
28. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. See generally 14B WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 1, § 3723 (4th ed. 2009 & Supp. 2011).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
30. See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("Due regard for the rightful inde-
pendence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they
scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has de-
fined.").
31. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(b). This restriction derives from the primary justification for di-
versity jurisdiction: to protect out-of-state litigants from hostile state courts. See Bank of the
U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
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B. Balancing the Plaintiff's Choice with the
Defendant's Right of Removal
Permitting a defendant to remove a case is a compromise between a
plaintiff's right to craft her lawsuit and the defendant's prerogative to select
a more neutral forum. 33 A plaintiff is master of her complaint and thus is
permitted to preclude removal in some circumstances. 34 To prevent diversi-
ty-based removal, a plaintiff has a number of options: plead less than the
jurisdictional amount, intentionally leave out a party who could remove the
action from the lawsuit, properly join a nondiverse party, or delay settlement
or dismissal of the nondiverse party until the state court action has been
pending for one year.3 5 These tools give a plaintiff the initial opportunity to
choose the forum.
Although the plaintiff's right to select the forum is a fundamental fea-
ture of the American legal system, 36 a defendant may exercise her right of
removal in certain circumstances.3 7 A defendant may remove a case that
originally could have been brought in federal court.38 The right of removal
in federal question cases is relatively uncontroversial because of the pres-
ence of a federal cause of action, but removal in diversity cases is subject to
more pronounced judicial criticism.39 Despite this criticism, diversity juris-
diction appears to be here to stay as Congress recently expanded the
33. Again, see Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 87, for the suggestion that fear of bias
against out-of-state litigants is a justification for diversity jurisdiction. More recently, diversity
jurisdiction itself has been subject to criticism, with some commentators even calling for its
elimination as a source of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 297 (5th ed. 2007).
34. 14B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3721. Courts have long recognized that a
plaintiff, as master of the complaint, can manipulate the forum in which her suit is brought
and even, in certain circumstances, prevent removability. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("The [Well Pleaded Complaint] rule makes the plaintiff the master
of the claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.").
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) ("[A] case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction
conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action.").
For a discussion of permissible tactics to prevent removal based on diversity jurisdiction, see
JAMES P. GEORGE, THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR 118-19 (2002), and 14B WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 1, § 3721.
36. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("But unless the bal-
ance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.").
37. 14B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 3721; see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816) ("This power of removal is not to be found in express
terms in any part of the constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a power
necessary and proper to carry into effect some express power.").
38. See supra Section I.A.
39. James M. Underwood, The Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 179, 193-95 (2006) (discussing the increasing judicial hostility toward removal based on
diversity jurisdiction).
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availability of removal based on diversity jurisdiction when it enacted the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. 40
Not only will diversity jurisdiction continue to exist but so will the ex-
acting standards that a defendant must satisfy to remove a case on diversity
grounds. The restrictions on removal indicate a high degree of deference to
the plaintiff's choice of forum.4 Such deference, however, is granted only
when the plaintiff properly exercises the right to craft her lawsuit.42 Because
of the potential for abuse, federal courts are permitted to look beyond the
face of the complaint to determine whether a nondiverse party was improp-
erly or fraudulently joined.
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND IMPROPER JOINDER
Federal courts have a number of tools to police the joinder of parties and
claims that exist only to prevent removal. A plaintiff can unfairly manipulate
removal either by suing a nondiverse defendant or joining with a nondiverse
plaintiff against a common defendant. Although federal courts use both the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the fraudulent joinder doctrine to po-
lice the joinder of sham defendants, courts have not consistently applied the
fraudulent joinder doctrine to police the joinder of sham plaintiffs. Section
I.A highlights the various tools federal courts use to police the improper
joinder of defendants. Section II.B gives an overview of the tools in place to
scrutinize the improper joinder of plaintiffs. Although the majority of the
tools are the same, a significant gap exists because the fraudulent joinder
doctrine does not traditionally apply to the joinder of plaintiffs. The few
courts that have applied an analogous approach to the joinder of sham plain-
tiffs have done so without a governing theoretical framework.
A. Improperly Joined Defendants
Federal courts police the joinder of defendants with Rule 21 and the
fraudulent joinder doctrine. Rule 21 is primarily a check on the mechanics
of joinder, in that a federal court may dismiss a diversity-destroying party
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006); see also Underwood, supra note 39, at 202 (discussing
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4).
41. Commentators and courts have found the following:
There is ... a qualitative difference between a device designed to invoke federal jurisdic-
tion and one designed to avoid it. In the former instance, the already overburdened
federal courts are being asked to adjudicate a case that, in the absence of the device,
would fall outside their statutory, and perhaps their constitutional, competence. In the lat-
ter, if the device succeeds, a case depending on state law merely remains in the state
court.
AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS 160 (1969).
42. See id. ("So long as federal diversity jurisdiction exists ... the need for its assertion
may well be greatest when the plaintiff tries hardest to defeat it.").
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for failure to satisfy the Rule 20 standards for joinder.43 Fraudulent joinder,
on the other hand, involves a more substantive look at the claims the diversi-
ty-destroying party presents. 44 Although a fraudulently joined party purports
to satisfy Rule 20, a court will nevertheless ignore her if her claim against
the defendant is substantively defective.
1. Rule 21
The primary tool federal courts have to police all forms of improper
joinder is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. 4' The rule provides that "[o]n
motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a
party. The court may also sever any claim against a party."4 Severance is
permitted in two distinct situations. First, a court may dismiss defendants
improperly joined under the permissive joinder requirements of Rule 20.47
Rule 20 permits defendants to be joined in an action if "any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to
or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences" and "any question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise in the action. '48 A defendant must satisfy both the same transac-
tion and occurrence requirement and the common question of law or fact
requirement to be joined in a lawsuit.49
Second, a federal court may sever even a properly joined defendant if
doing so is in the interests of justice.50 Courts often invoke this power to
sever a diversity-destroying defendant whose presence in the lawsuit is not
required; "[tlhe jurisdictional defect may be cured if the parties joined are
not indispensable, for the Court in the exercise of its sound discretion on
motion of any party or of its own initiative may permit them to be dropped
under Rule 21 ... ."I' Essentially, a federal court is permitted to determine
independently if the defendant's right of removal is strong enough to over-
come the plaintiff's interest in structuring the lawsuit.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 20-21.
44. See infra Section II.A.2.
45. FED. R. Civ. P. 21.
46. Id.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(b). The defect leading to this type of severance is usually referred
to as misjoinder. 25 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 59:205 (West 2011).
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
49. 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1683 (3d ed. 2001) [hereinafter 7 WRIGHT & MILLER].
50. Tab Express Int'l, Inc. v. Aviation Simulation Tech., Inc., 215 ER.D. 621, 623 (D.
Kan. 2003) ("Courts may order a Rule 21 severance when it will serve the ends of justice and
further the prompt and efficient disposition of litigation.").
51. Padbury v. Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n, 15 F.R.D. 484,485 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
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An important limitation to the severance discretion of Rule 21 is Rule
19, which compels joinder of all necessary parties.12 A party is considered
necessary if that party's rights would be impacted by the outcome of the
litigation. 53 If a party is required to be joined under Rule 19, a court may not
sever a defendant even if the party was misjoined or improperly joined. Rule
19 requires the joinder of defendants in two situations. First, a defendant
must be joined if nonjoinder of the defendant "would prevent complete re-
lief from being accorded. 54 Second, a defendant must be joined if the
party's "absence from the action will have a prejudicial effect on that per-
son's ability to protect [his] interest or will 'leave an existing party subject
to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations.' -5 Because codefendants often share some liability, the pres-
ence of both in a lawsuit is usually required.
2. The Fraudulent Joinder Doctrine
Before Rule 21, federal courts developed their own robust tool to police
jurisdictional manipulation: the fraudulent joinder doctrine. The fraudulent
joinder doctrine permits a federal court, when faced with a plaintiff's mo-
tion to remand, to ignore a diversity-destroying defendant if the court
determines that the plaintiff has no reasonable basis for adding a claim
against that defendant.56 Under the doctrine, a court may pierce the plead-
ings to determine whether a plaintiff has a legitimate claim against the
diversity-destroying defendant.57 The doctrine is based on the proposition
that a plaintiff who impleads a nondiverse defendant only to defeat removal
is acting unfairly both toward the nondiverse defendant, who need not be in
the lawsuit, and the diverse defendant, whose statutory right of removal is
52. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, § 1685 ("[A] prerequisite to dropping a party
under Rule 21 because the party's citizenship destroys the court's subject-matter jurisdiction
over the case, is that the party's presence in the action is not required by Rule 19.").
53. Padbury, 15 F.R.D. at 485 ("Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in
the controversy that a final decree cannot be entered in their absence without adversely affect-
ing their rights or without leaving the action in a state which would be inconsistent with equity
and good conscience.").
54. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, § 1604.
55. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(l)(B)(ii)).
56. See Underwood, supra note 14, at 1033-35. The fraudulent joinder doctrine is dis-
tinct from the collusive joinder doctrine, which requires a federal court to decline jurisdiction
if it finds that a party was joined collusively. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006) ("A district court shall
not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.").
57. Richardson, supra note 19, at 144. Piercing the pleadings includes looking at out-
side evidence, such as affidavits and deposition testimony. See Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc.,
236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[F]raudulent joinder claims may be resolved by ...
consider[ation of] summary judgment-type evidence such as affidavits and deposition testimo-
ny." (quoting Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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unjustly extinguished.5 8 However, if the nondiverse defendant is not fraudu-
lently joined, the federal court must remand the case because, absent
complete diversity, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the case.5 9
The Supreme Court first authorized courts to scrutinize the joinder of
nondiverse defendants in 1886.60 In Plymouth Gold Mining Co. v. Amador &
Sacramento Canal Co., the defendants argued that removal was proper be-
cause their nondiverse co-parties were attached only as "'sham defendants'
to prevent a removal."'6 The Court found that because the complaint alleged
a facially legitimate cause of action against all defendants, the defendant
bore the burden of establishing that the cause of action was fraudulent-a
burden the defendant failed to carry. 62 Building off Plymouth Gold Mining,
the Court employed the fraudulent joiner doctrine in Wecker v. National
Enameling & Stamping Co.63 The plaintiff, a resident of Missouri, sued his
diverse employer and two nondiverse employees of the company in state
court. 64 The defendant filed for removal, alleging that one employee was not
a Missouri resident and the second was not related to the lawsuit.65 Relying
on affidavits, the Court found for the defendant:
While the plaintiff, in good faith, may proceed in the state courts upon a
cause of action which he alleges to be joint, it is equally true that the Fed-
eral courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a
Federal court where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to
protect the right to proceed in the Federal court as to permit the state
courts, in proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.'
Wecker not only deployed fraudulent joinder analysis, but it also indicated
that the Court would enforce limits on a plaintiff's right to determine the
removability of a case.67
After establishing that a defendant could defeat a remand motion by
claiming that a party was fraudulently joined, the Court clarified the doc-
trine's boundaries. In Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v. Cockrell,68 a
Kentucky plaintiff sued a railroad company and two nondiverse employees
of the railroad. Finding for the plaintiff on the motion for remand, the Court
58. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97-98 (1921).
59. See, e.g., Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 811 (8th Cir. 2003).
60. See Plymouth Gold Mining Co. v. Amador & Sacramento Canal Co., 118 U.S. 264
(1886).
61. Id. at 270.
62. Id. at 270-71.
63. 204 U.S. 176 (1907).
64. Wecker, 204 U.S. at 178.
65. Id. at 180.
66. Id. at 185-86.
67. See Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97 (1921) ("[A defendant's]
right of removal cannot be defeated by a fraudulent joinder of a resident defendant having no
real connection with the controversy." (citing Wecker, 204 U.S. at 185-86)).
68. 232 U.S. 146(1914).
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held that the burden was on the defendant to show that the joinder of the two
defendants "was merely a fraudulent device to prevent a removal."69 The
Court commented that it would find fraudulent joinder only if the plaintiff's
claim against the nondiverse parties "was without any reasonable basis. '70 In
a later case, the Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff's motive for the
joinder of parties was irrelevant to the question of fraudulent joinder.'
The current state of the fraudulent joinder doctrine gives a defendant
two ways to defeat a plaintiff's motion for remand. First, the defendant can
prove that the plaintiff pleaded false jurisdictional facts, indicating actual
fraud.72 Second, the defendant can prove that there is no possibility that the
plaintiff will recover against the nondiverse defendant.73
Although there are some inconsistencies among courts in the deploy-
ment of the doctrine, 74 its existence is critical to the policing of unfair
jurisdictional manipulation. The doctrine's primary benefits are its mandato-
ry nature and the extent to which federal courts can pierce the pleadings to
determine whether the joinder was fraudulent. Furthermore, the doctrine
provides relatively straightforward standards to determine whether a non-
diverse defendant was joined solely to defeat removal. Circuits differ on
what level of piercing is permitted,75 but most adopt a procedure similar to
69. Cockrell, 232 U.S. at 153.
70. Id.
71. Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 189 (1931) ("[T]he motive of a
plaintiff in joining defendants is immaterial, provided there is in good faith a cause of action
against those joined '). The distinction between good faith and motive turns on whether the
plaintiff has a colorable claim against the defendant: so long as a plaintiff has a legitimate
claim against a defendant, it is immaterial why the plaintiff is pursuing that claim.
72. See Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
73. See, e.g., Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir.
1999) ("Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] had at
least a colorable cause of action against [the defendant] in the Michigan state courts."). Some
courts have argued that there is a third form of fraudulent joinder: where a plaintiff has proce-
durally misjoined nondiverse parties to prevent removal. See E. Farish Percy, Making a
Federal Case Out of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder,
91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 215 (2005). However, this type of fraudulent joinder is more properly
labeled fraudulent misjoinder and is outside the scope of this Note. See generally William E.
Marple, Removal to Federal Court Based on Misjoinder of Parties, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 551
(2009).
74. See infra Section II.B.1.
75. Most circuits permit limited piercings of the pleadings. See, e.g., Smallwood v. I11.
Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 2004) ("Attempting to proceed beyond this summary
process carries a heavy risk of moving the court beyond jurisdiction and into a resolution of
the merits .... "); Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001)
("[F]raudulent joinder claims may be resolved by ... consider[ation of] summary judgment-
type evidence such as affidavits and deposition testimony." (quoting Cavallini v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 E3d 256, 263 (5th Cir. 1995))); Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457, 465
(4th Cir. 1999) ("Further, in determining whether an attempted joinder is fraudulent, the court
is not bound by the allegations of the pleadings, but may instead consider the entire record,
and determine the basis of joinder by any means available." (internal citations omitted)); Boy-
er, 913 F.2d at 112; Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir.
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that used when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.76 This type of
procedure permits the court to weigh evidence outside of the pleadings, in-
cluding affidavits and deposition testimony.77 Because it is mandatory and
because it permits a court, on remand, to consider facts outside of the com-
plaint, the fraudulent joinder doctrine is an enormously powerful tool for
federal courts to use in vindicating a defendant's right of removal.
B. Improperly Joined Plaintiffs
Federal courts have the same Rule 21 severance authority to police the
joinder of plaintiffs. 78 However, federal courts lack an analog to the fraudu-
lent joinder doctrine.79 As such, instances of unfair jurisdictional
manipulation in the context of joined plaintiffs may go unnoticed.
1. Rule 21
Federal courts deploy the severance power of Rule 21 to scrutinize the
joinder of plaintiffs. Like defendants, plaintiffs may be permissively joined
under Rule 20 provided that such plaintiffs "assert any right to relief jointly,
severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same,
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.""° Plain-
tiffs' claims must also share a common question of law or fact.8 ' If the
joined plaintiffs fail to satisfy either requirement, the court may sever the
misjoined party under Rule 21.
Rule 21 also permits a federal court to sever properly joined plaintiffs if
doing so is in the "interests of justice. 8 2 This provides a federal court the
discretion to dismiss a diversity-destroying plaintiff from the lawsuit in or-
der to preserve its subject matter jurisdiction. This authority, like the
authority to dismiss properly joined defendants, is discretionary. 3
The court's severance authority is limited by Rule 19. If a joined plain-
tiff is "necessary" under Rule 19, a court may not sever that party-even if
doing so would be in the interests of justice.' 4 This restriction makes sense
given the Federal Rules' concern with efficiency: if a lawsuit is to proceed,
1967) ("[T]he issue must be capable of summary determination and be proven with complete
certainty." (quoting Dodd v. Fawcett Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 82, 85 (10th Cir. 1964)).
76. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 518 (2004); see
also Percy, supra note 73, at 226.
77. See Morris, 236 F.3d at 1068.
78. See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, § 1682.
79. See infra Section II.B.2.
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A).
81. FED. R. Civ. R 20(a)(1)(B).
82. See Tab Express Int'l, Inc. v. Aviation Simulation Tech., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 621, 623
(D. Kan. 2003).
83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("[T]he court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a
party. The court may also sever any claim against a party." (emphasis added)).
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
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all relevant parties whose rights may be impacted by the lawsuit should be
present. However, there are few instances where a plaintiff would be
considered "necessary" under Rule 19 because each plaintiff with a legiti-
mate claim has an individual right to sue a defendant. The fact that a
substantially similar case was brought against a common defendant does not
(in most situations) alter the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. 5 But in
certain cases where a plaintiff is a necessary party, federal courts may not
use the severance prerogative of Rule 21 to retain jurisdiction over a re-
moved case.86
2. Other Methods
There is a disparity between the tools federal courts have to police sham
defendants and sham plaintiffs. Specifically, in the context of sham
plaintiffs, there has not been a consistently applied analog to the fraudulent
joinder doctrine. 87 Without a similar doctrine, a removing defendant loses
two important protections: mandatory dismissal of fraudulently joined plain-
tiffs and the opportunity to present evidence outside of the pleadings.88
Some courts have recognized that a plaintiff-centered fraudulent joinder
rule should apply.89 Those district courts that deploy fraudulent-joinder-like
analysis to plaintiffs properly recognize-as this Note does-that there is no
reason why the fraudulent joinder framework cannot be applied to sham
plaintiffs. 90 But these courts are applying the doctrine without any clear
guidance from their respective circuits. Thus, defendants still risk having a
different district court in the same circuit conclude that the fraudulent join-
der doctrine does not extend to plaintiffs.
85. This right is grounded in the Due Process Clause. A cause of action is essentially
property of the individual claimant; thus, each plaintiff has a right to defend her property in
court. For example, the Supreme Court has stated,
The due process clause requires that every man shall have the protection of his day in
court, and the benefit of the general law, a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds not arbitrarily or capriciously but upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial, so that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under the
protection of the general rules which govern society.
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535
(1884)); see also 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 49, § 1683 ("Rule 20 is merely a procedur-
al device and does not alter the substantive rights of the parties.").
86. See supra notes 52-53, 84, and accompanying text.
87. See Heather R. Barber, V Removal and Remand, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1555, 1565
(2004) (discussing the possibility that fraudulent joinder may apply to plaintiffs).
88. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Foslip Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 92 E Supp. 2d 891, 903 (N.D.
Iowa 2000); Lerma v. Univision Commc'ns, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1014 (E.D. Wis. 1999);
Nelson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 328, 330 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
90. Not all courts are willing to extend fraudulent joinder to sham plaintiffs. See John-
ston Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 45 E Supp. 2d 1308, 1312-14 (M.D. Ala. 1999) ("[T]he
application of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder of a defendant does not extend to include the
alleged fraudulent joinder of a plaintiff.").
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Even in the districts that do not affirmatively invoke the fraudulent join-
der doctrine, courts sometimes permit parties to present materials outside of
the pleadings on remand motions.9' This usually occurs when the
defendant challenges a plaintiff's characterization of a claim as purely state-
law based.92 Because of the possibility of manipulation, courts do not have
to accept the characterization of the cause of action found in the complaint
and may, under certain circumstances, use outside materials to determine the
proper characterization. 93 Courts have also looked beyond the pleadings to
scrutinize a suit's actual amount in controversy,94 to determine if the plaintiff
is circumventing a prior adjudication of her claim,95 and to decide if a de-
fendant has sought removal twice in the same action.96 While these
examples show that federal courts have pierced the pleadings in narrow cir-
cumstances, there is no set framework for piercing the pleadings with regard
to the joining of sham plaintiffs to a lawsuit.
District courts are not unfamiliar with the type of analysis that a plain-
tiff-centered fraudulent joinder doctrine would bring. However, because
there has not been a consistent application of the doctrine, defendants are
unable to rely on its well-established procedures and standards when con-
fronted with a sham plaintiff. To properly protect a defendant's right of
removal in the face of a diversity-destroying plaintiff, courts should deploy
the standards and procedures of the fraudulent joinder doctrine.
III. FASHIONING A PLAINTIFF-CENTERED FRAUDULENT
JOINDER DOCTRINE
This Part argues that extending the fraudulent joinder doctrine provides
the simplest and most effective way to guard against unfair jurisdictional
gaming by plaintiffs who join with a sham plaintiff. Section III.A presents
the likely situations in which the doctrine would be deployed. Section II.B
discusses and refutes possible arguments against the extension of the doc-
trine.
A. Situations Involving Sham Plaintiffs
Extending the fraudulent joinder doctrine would permit a court to ignore
a diversity-destroying plaintiff in two situations. First, a court could ignore a
91. Romano v. Kazacos, 609 F.3d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 2010) ("[If subject matter jurisdic-
tion is contested, courts are permitted to look to materials outside the pleadings.").
92. Oglesby v. RCA Corp., 752 F.2d 272, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1985) ("It is proper for the
court to examine the record to determine if the real nature of the claim is federal, notwith-
standing plaintiff's characterization to the contrary." (internal quotations omitted)).
93. E.g., Brooks v. Solomon Co., 542 F Supp. 1229, 1231 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (analyzing
deposition testimony to determine that the plaintiff's characterization of her claim as grounded
in state law was false, thus permitting removal).
94. E.g., Ellis v. Logan Co., 543 F. Supp. 586, 588 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
95. E.g., Villarreal v. Brown Express, Inc., 529 F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1976).
96. E.g., S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1996).
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diversity-destroying plaintiff if the plaintiff pleads false jurisdictional
facts. 97 Second, a court could ignore a plaintiff if the defendant proves that
there is no possibility that the plaintiff can recover against the nondiverse
defendant.98 The first situation arises in cases of actual fraud. 99 The second
occurs because the diversity-destroying plaintiff is estopped from pursuing
joint litigation. In other words, something outside the complaint itself must
constrain the plaintiff such that there is no possibility of recovering against
the defendant in the joint suit. This is likely to occur where the diversity-
destroying plaintiff is subject to a mandatory forum selection clause'0° or
where the joined plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the applicable stat-
ute of limitations.101
1. Pleading False Jurisdictional Facts
Although most instances of fraudulent joinder do not require any show-
ing of fraud, the fraudulent joinder doctrine covers instances where a
plaintiff pleads false jurisdictional facts to destroy complete diversity. 10 2
Extending the doctrine to cover a plaintiff's actual fraud in pleading juris-
dictional facts is doctrinally sound, even if it will seldom be employed.
In the typical case, the diversity-destroying plaintiff alleges in her com-
plaint that her residence is the same as the state of incorporation of the
defendant. Under the fraudulent joinder doctrine, a removing defendant is
permitted to introduce evidence beyond the pleadings to prove whether the
plaintiff has committed actual fraud in her pleading of jurisdictional facts.10 3
Like the traditional fraudulent joinder doctrine, a defendant would still bear
the burden of proving actual fraud. 1°' Because all factual allegations are
evaluated "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,"'15 the defendant must
do more than raise a reasonable doubt as to the true residency of the plain-
tiff.106
97. See Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
98. See, e.g., Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir.
1999) ("Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, the inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] had at
least a colorable cause of action against [the defendant] in the Michigan state courts.").
99. See infra Section III.A. I.
100. See infra Section IlI.A.2.
101. See infra Section III.A.3.
102. See Boyer, 913 F.2d at 111.
103. See B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 551 n.14 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec.
1981).
104. Id. at 548.
105. Id. at 549.
106. See Oliva v. Chrysler Corp., 978 F Supp. 685, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (finding that
the defendant failed to carry its burden in establishing "outright fraud" by clear and convinc-
ing evidence when it failed to produce any evidence); cf Boyer, 913 F2d at Il1 ("[T]here is
no suggestion by defendants that plaintiffs have falsely alleged their Pennsylvania citizenship
or that of Baldwin and Kaiser [the defendants]."). If a defendant does not challenge the stated
doniciles of the other parties, the pleadings of the jurisdictional facts are considered non-
fraudulent even if they turn out to be false. See Green v. Amerada Hess Corp., 707 F.2d 201,
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2. Mandatory Forum Selection Clauses
A plaintiff-centered fraudulent joinder doctrine would also protect freely
negotiated forum selection clauses. Parties entering into complex
cross-forum contracts may include forum selection clauses to designate an
exclusive forum for potential litigation. These contracts not only restrict a
party's choice of forum, but they also limit the parties' ability to enter into a
related lawsuit in an alternative forum.
Forum selection clauses can be either permissive or mandatory." 7 Per-
missive clauses authorize both jurisdiction and venue in a particular forum,
but they do not prohibit litigation in another forum. 08 A permissive clause
does not alter a defendant's right to remove a case to federal court, even if
the original litigation commenced in the designated state forum."09 A manda-
tory clause is much more restrictive: a case can only be brought in the
specified forum.I" A plaintiff subject to a mandatory forum selection clause
is estopped from joining a lawsuit outside of the forum."'I Fraudulent join-
der would be implicated in the face of mandatory forum selection clauses
only.112 Because mandatory forum selection clauses require all disputes to
be litigated in one forum, they also preserve the defendant's right of removal
by preventing either party from using their diversity-destroying potential.
Imagine a contract between a franchisor and franchisee, which includes a
forum selection clause that restricts all suits to the state of the franchisee." 3
205 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that because the defendant admitted that the other parties were
Mississippi residents, the plaintiff's pleading of jurisdictional facts was "obviously not fraudu-
lent").
107. 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDER-
AL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3803.1 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter 14D
WRIGHT & MILLER].
108. See IntraComm, Inc. v. Bajaj, 492 F.3d 285, 290 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding a forum
selection clause permissive because it "permits jurisdiction in one court but does not prohibit
jurisdiction in another").
109. See, e.g., Global Satellite Commc'n Co. v. Starmill U.K. Ltd., 378 F.3d 1269, 1273
(11 th Cir. 2004).
110. See 14D WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 107, § 3803.1.
111. See id.
112. Mandatory forum selection clauses come in two types. The first specifies both a
forum and a venue, such that all possible litigation must be brought in a specific state and
particular court. For example, "[a]ll litigation shall be brought in the state court of the location
of the franchisee." See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 259 (2004) ("If mandatory venue lan-
guage is employed ... the clause will be enforced.' (citing John Boutari & Son, Wines &
Spirits, S.A. v. Attiki Imps. & Distribs. Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1994))). A mandatory
forum selection clause that requires all litigation to be pursued in state court precludes the
defendant from removing to federal court and thus would not implicate the extension of the
fraudulent joinder doctrine. The second type of forum selection clause specifies a particular
forum but does not restrict venue to either a state or federal court. Because it does not specify
a venue, an action brought in state court is removable by the defendant and thus implicates the
fraudulent joinder doctrine.
113. This hypothetical case is based in part on Taco Bell Corp. v. Dairy Farmers of
America, Inc., 727 F Supp. 2d 604 (W.D. Ky. 2010).
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At first blush, this type of agreement appears to give little benefit to the
franchisor because it subjects the company to suit in any state in which it
has a franchise. However, by restricting each franchisee to its home-state
court, the franchisor preserves its right of removal in every state outside of
its principal place of business and state of incorporation.' 14 A mandatory
forum selection clause, written between a franchisor and franchisee from the
same state, prevents the franchisees in the franchisor's home state from
shopping their diversity-destroying capability to another franchisee. Put an-
other way, the franchisor is limiting its exposure to state court proceedings
only to its home state because its home-state franchisees cannot join law-
suits outside the home state.
An illustrative case, Taco Bell Corp. v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc.,
was decided in 2010. 11 The plaintiffs were two groups of Taco Bell fran-
chisees who collectively sued Dairy Farmers of America for breach of
contract in Kentucky state court.1 16 The first group of plaintiffs was com-
prised entirely of Kentucky franchisees." 7 If this group had filed suit
independently, Dairy Farmers could have removed the case because it was a
resident of Kansas and Missouri. However, the Kentucky franchisees filed
suit jointly with the second group-which included franchisees in Kansas
and Missouri) 8 These plaintiffs shared a state of residence with the defend-
ant and thus their presence in the lawsuit precluded removability. Seeking
removal, the defendant argued that the nondiverse franchisees in the second
group were fraudulently joined because "under the forum selection clause
[between the franchisor and the defendant], their actions [could] only be
maintained in a jurisdiction other than Kentucky."' 19 Essentially, the defend-
ant was arguing that the out-of-state franchisees could only avoid federal
court by maintaining the suit in their home-state court (either Kansas or
Missouri).
The court deployed a form of plaintiff-centered fraudulent joinder doc-
trine 2° but held that the nondiverse plaintiffs need not be severed, because
the plaintiffs had a colorable claim that the forum selection clause was for
their unilateral benefit and was thus waivable.' 21 Because it was waivable,
114. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006), an in-state defendant is not permitted to remove
a case to federal court.
115. Taco Bell, 727 F. Supp. 2d 604.
116. The contract was between Taco Bell and Dairy Farmers, but the franchisees were
permitted to sue as third-party beneficiaries to the contract. See id. at 606.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The forum selection clause stated that "[t]he exclusive venue for any proceeding
between Supplier [Dairy Farmers] and any Designated Affiliate [Plaintiffs] shall be the locali-
ty of the Designated Affiliate's principal place of business:' Id. (alterations in original).
120. The court correctly recited the standards for the fraudulent joinder doctrine. See id.
at 606 (noting that the burden is placed on the removing party and that all ambiguities in state
law must be resolved in favor of the nonremoving party).
121. Id. at609.
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the court found that the nondiverse plaintiffs were properly joined and the
action was remanded to state court.122
This ruling was erroneous. Taco Bell shows why a consistent and more
robust plaintiff-centered fraudulent joinder doctrine must be applied. The
court's decision that the forum selection clause was unilateral ignored the
two advantages to mandatory forum selection clauses discussed above. Be-
cause the clause restricted each franchisee to sue in its own state, the
supplier would have the right to remove in every state but its state of incor-
poration and the state of its principal place of business (here Kansas and
Missouri).1 23 Although the court deployed a form of fraudulent joinder anal-
ysis, it failed to properly identify the effect that a forum selection clause has
on a defendant's right of removal. The nondiverse group in Taco Bell in-
cluded sham plaintiffs because they were contractually estopped from
joining the Kentucky state lawsuit. If the court had conducted a proper
fraudulent joinder analysis, this group would have been dismissed from the
lawsuit, and the suit as between Dairy Farmers and the group of Kentucky
franchisees would have proceeded in Kentucky state court.
All mandatory forum selection clauses that specify a forum outside of
the defendant's home state implicitly preserve the defendant's right of re-
moval. As such, a nondiverse plaintiff who violates the forum selection
clause to join a lawsuit in a prohibited forum is both violating the contract
and engaging in jurisdictional manipulation. While the former violation is
handled by any number of remedies, such as a motion to dismiss in state
court, 2 4 there is no remedy that addresses the concern of jurisdictional ma-
nipulation and the deprivation of the defendant's right of removal. Relying
on a motion to dismiss in state court both fails to properly protect the de-
fendant's right of removal by delaying the exercise of that right and could
potentially extinguish that right altogether if the state court fails to rule for
one year.2 5 To preserve this right, federal courts should deploy the fraudu-
lent joinder doctrine in cases where the joinder of a nondiverse plaintiff
violates a valid forum selection clause.
3. Statute of Limitations
A court may also ignore a diversity-destroying plaintiff where the plain-
tiff's claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and recovery
122. Id. at 609-10.
123. This restriction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006), which prohibits removal
for an in-state defendant.
124. For actions brought in state courts, a defendant can typically file a motion to dis-
miss when the claim is brought in the improper forum. See, e.g., John G. Powers, Planning for
Forum Selection in Commercial Transactions, N.Y ST. B. Ass'N J., Feb. 2006, at 22, 22. If the
action were brought in federal court, a defendant would have more options, including filing a
motion to dismiss, asking for a transfer to the contracted-for forum, or seeking transfer on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. See 1 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL
COURTS § 3:33 (Robert L. Haig ed., 3d ed. 2011).
125. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (stating the one-year time limit for removal).
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against the defendant is thus impossible. This is likely to occur when plain-
tiffs sue under their own state law in a joint suit against a common
defendant. If the statute of limitations is already expired in one state, the
plaintiff with an expired claim should not be permitted to destroy diversity.
In reviewing the motion for remand, district courts are not wholly confined
to looking at the face of the complaint, 126 so it is possible that the running of
the statute of limitations would be uncovered.
Although determining if a statute of limitations has run is often an easy
inquiry, its incorporation into the traditional fraudulent joinder doctrine is
contested.' 17 Those courts that limit the reviewability of statute of limita-
tions challenges usually ground their unwillingness to pierce the pleadings
in a reluctance to upset complicated state court proceedings.' 28 In contrast,
some courts have permitted a defendant to raise a statute of limitations de-
fense to preserve removal. 29 Ultimately, permitting a nondiverse party with
an expired claim to upset removal is unfair to the defendant. Because fraud-
ulent joinder is meant to vindicate a defendant's right of removal, the
doctrine as applied to all sham parties should extend to cover statute of limi-
tations claims.
B. Evaluating the Doctrine's Extension
Although extending the doctrine of fraudulent joinder is a simple propo-
sition, there are a number of legitimate concerns that arise with any
alteration to civil litigation's liberal joinder rules. Nevertheless, these con-
cerns are outweighed by the strong interests that counsel in favor of
adopting a consistent plaintiff-centered fraudulent joinder doctrine.
1. Objections
The most effective critique of any extension of the fraudulent joinder
doctrine is the lack of consistency between circuits in the deployment of the
current doctrine. To prove the existence of fraudulent joinder, a defendant
must show that the plaintiff sued the nondiverse defendant solely to prevent
removal. 30 This requires showing that the plaintiff does not have a legiti-
mate cause of action against the defendant. Although the test seems simple,
126. See 14C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 18, § 3734 ("Fortunately, in practice, the
federal courts usually do not limit their inquiry to the face of the plaintiff's complaint, but
rather consider the facts disclosed in the record of the case as a whole, in determining the
propriety of removal.").
127. Compare In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2006) (permitting fraudulent
joinder analysis of a statute of limitations claim), with Riverdale Baptist Church v. Certainteed
Corp., 349 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949-50 (D. Md. 2004) (finding that the piercing of the pleadings
permitted by fraudulent joinder analysis did not permit an inquiry into the statute of limita-
tions).
128. Riverdale, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 950.
129. See, e.g., Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co., 139 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (9th Cir. 1998).
130. For a complete discussion of the standards, see Percy, supra note 73, at 216-20, and
Underwood, supra note 14, at 1045-86.
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there is no agreed-upon standard to determine if a cause of action is legiti-
mate. Courts and commentators have identified the "reasonable basis for the
claim" test, 131 the "no possibility of recovery" test, 13 2 the "no reasonable
possibility of recovery" test,'33 and the "failure to state a claim" test."3 The
divergence among circuits is cause for concern when considering an exten-
sion of the doctrine of fraudulent joinder.'35
But problems of application in the area of sham plaintiffs are largely
overstated. First, most courts follow a uniform procedure to determine if
fraudulent joinder exists in the sham defendant context. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit has recited the most common procedure:
To determine whether the case should be remanded, the district court must
evaluate the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
and must resolve any uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of
the plaintiff. The federal court makes these determinations based on the
plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal; but the court may consider af-
fidavits and deposition transcripts submitted by the parties.'36
It is only after courts deploy this procedure that questions of the appropriate
standard arise. Second, in the context of plaintiff-centered fraudulent join-
der, the differing standards do not pose as much of a problem because of the
narrow circumstances under which fraudulent joinder review of sham plain-
tiffs should be permitted. And because the limited circumstances in which
the fraudulent joinder doctrine should be applied to the joinder of sham
plaintiffs involve largely objective criteria, the concern about inconsistent
standards is insignificant.
131. Filla v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 336 F.3d 806, 810 (8th Cir. 2003) (looking to the plead-
ings to determine if there is no "reasonable basis in fact and law supporting a claim" (quoting
Wiles v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 280 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cited in Percy, supra note 73, at 216.
132. Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F3d 1536, 1538 (1lth Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhe removing party
has the burden of proving that either: (1) there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a
cause of action against the resident defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently pled juris-
dictional facts to bring the resident defendant into state court." (citing Cabalceta v. Standard
Fruit Co., 883 F.2d 1553, 1561 (11 th Cir. 1989))), cited in Percy, supra note 73, at 216.
133. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applies the fraudulent joinder rule most
liberally. See Gray ex rel. Rudd v. Beverly Enters.-Miss., Inc., 390 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir.
2004) ("[T]he plaintiff may not rely solely on the allegations in his complaint; the court may
'pierce the pleadings' and consider summary judgment-type evidence to determine whether
the plaintiff truly has a reasonable possibility of recovery in state court.").
134. Stephen E. Abraham & William M. Hensley, Remand: One Constitution, One
Standard, 27 PEPP. L. REv. 263, 270 (2000) (arguing that fraudulent joinder should be evalu-
ated like a 12(b)(6) motion).
135. See Percy, supra note 73, at 215 (noting that the century-long evolution of the doc-
trine has left a myriad of standards); Richardson, supra note 19, at 122 ("[T]his complexity is
reflected and exacerbated in federal circuits ... "); Underwood, supra note 14, at 1022-23
(noting the widespread confusion among district courts on what standard to apply).
136. Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538 (citations omitted) (citing B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
663 F.2d 545,549 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981)).
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Similarly, there is some disagreement among circuits as to how far
courts are permitted to pierce the pleadings. 137 But unlike the circuit split
regarding standards for what is considered fraudulent joinder, there is rela-
tively widespread acceptance of the summary judgment standard for the
extent to which courts may pierce the pleadings; generally, courts may con-
sider the entire record available at the time of remand. 138 The summary
judgment standard permits an appropriate amount of piercing and would
reveal the information required to support a finding of fraudulent joinder in
the narrow situations presented above. Furthermore, the traditional fraudu-
lent joinder analysis incorporates a strong presumption in favor of remand,
which would alleviate potential unfairness to properly joined plaintiffs. 139
A further practical objection might be that severing plaintiffs who satisfy
Rule 20 violates the voluntary/involuntary rule. 4 ° Because the proposed
expansion covers only plaintiffs, the voluntary/involuntary rule is not impli-
cated. Although a finding of fraudulent joinder would, in essence,
involuntarily dismiss the diversity-destroying plaintiff from the lawsuit, both
plaintiffs' rights would remain intact.t4t The diverse plaintiff would retain
the right to initiate suit in state court, but the defendant would get to exer-
cise the right of removal. The only benefit the diversity-destroying plaintiff
bestowed on the diverse plaintiff was nonremovability. But if the court finds
that the diversity-destroying plaintiff was fraudulently joined, it essentially
would be determining that the plaintiffs had no right to sue jointly in the
first place. The diverse plaintiff would get exactly what a plaintiff is entitled
to: the option to initially file in state court with the possibility that the de-
fendant will remove. Likewise, the nondiverse plaintiff would still retain the
right to sue, albeit in a different forum.
Even if the doctrine can be implemented, a question arises as to whether
federal courts should be taking on more cases by policing the joinder of
sham plaintiffs. Certainly, the extension of the doctrine may result in a nom-
inal increase in the number of diversity cases in federal court. But a
137. See Percy, supra note 73, at 224-26 ("While most courts do pierce the pleadings,
some courts engage in extremely limited piercing, while others engage in broad piercing simi-
lar to that used by the courts when ruling on summary judgment motions.").
138. AM. LAw INST., supra note 76, at 518; see also Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538.
139. See Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that all
inferences go to the nonremoving party).
140. The voluntary/involuntary rule has two prongs. First, if the plaintiff voluntarily
dismisses a nondiverse party, the defendant may remove the case to federal court, provided
that the proper removal procedures are followed. See Powers v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co.,
169 U.S. 92, 101-02 (1898). Second, if the nondiverse party is dismissed from the lawsuit
involuntarily, the defendant does not gain the right to remove. See Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175
U.S. 635 (1900) (finding that a ruling on the merits in favor of the diversity-destroying de-
fendant did not permit removal for the remaining defendant). In limiting removal to situations
where the nondiverse party is voluntary dismissed, the voluntary/involuntary rule entrenches
the plaintiff's choice of form.
141. See 7 Wright & Miller, supra note 49, § 1652 ("Rule 20 is merely a procedural
device and does not alter the substantive rights of the parties .... [Elach plaintiff's right of
action remains distinct, as if it had been brought separately.").
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plaintiff-centered fraudulent joinder doctrine would not increase the number
of suits that could be brought in federal court; rather, it would assure de-
fendants that removable cases would remain removable despite attempted
jurisdictional manipulation by plaintiffs.
2. Benefits
The benefits of extending a well-established doctrine to cover new forms
of jurisdictional manipulation are consistency and competence. Extending
the doctrine would give defendants the flexibility to introduce materials out-
side of the pleadings to challenge a plaintiff's presence in a lawsuit. 42
Moreover, courts treat the dismissal of a fraudulently joined party as manda-
tory, 43 so that the extension would ensure that all federal courts ignore the
joinder of sham plaintiffs. This would be an improvement over the discre-
tionary nature of the Rule 21 severance power.' 44 Other methods of policing
unfair jurisdictional manipulation are similarly reliant on a judge's discre-
tion and thus do not provide robust enough protection for a defendant's right
of removal. 145
Extending the doctrine to police plaintiff-centered fraudulent joinder not
only will help alleviate the potential shortfalls of relying on a court's discre-
tion, but it will also make the inquiry more efficient for federal courts which
can rely on the well-established limitations of the doctrine itself. Relatedly,
federal courts have been deploying the doctrine to sham defendants for over
a hundred years and have developed a competency in determining whether a
party has been joined solely to prevent removal. The transition to analyzing
plaintiffs should impose no significant burdens on the judiciary.
From a policy perspective, extending the doctrine would properly
reestablish the balance between a plaintiff's right to structure her lawsuit
and the defendant's right of removal. Although the plaintiff has the right to
establish the initial structure of her lawsuit, there is no right to unfairly de-
prive a defendant of her right of removal, as recognized by both Rule 21 and
the traditional fraudulent joinder doctrine. Permitting courts to engage in
fraudulent joinder analysis for a narrow set of plaintiffs would not disrupt
142. See, e.g., Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2001).
143. See Wecker v. Nat'l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907) ("[Tlhe
Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court
where one has that right, and should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the
Federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.");
see also id. at 185-86.
144. See Tab Express Int'l, Inc. v. Aviation Simulation Tech., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 621, 623
(D. Kan. 2003).
145. See Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding
that the one-year time limit on removal is subject to equitable exception at the court's discre-
tion).
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the liberal joinder rules currently in place; rather, it would prevent jurisdic-
tional gaming that is already contrary to federal practice. 46
CONCLUSION
For over one hundred years, federal courts have scrutinized the joinder
of nondiverse defendants with the fraudulent joinder doctrine. The doctrine
continues to play a role in preventing plaintiffs from manipulating jurisdic-
tion by suing sham defendants. Because plaintiffs can unfairly preclude
removability by joining with sham plaintiffs, the doctrine should be extend-
ed to permit federal courts to use the same type of analysis against joint
plaintiffs. Extending the doctrine would strike the appropriate balance be-
tween preserving the plaintiff's right to structure the lawsuit and protecting
the defendant's choice to remove a completely diverse case to a neutral, fed-
eral forum.
146. See Scott R. Haiber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609,
645 (2004) (noting the various forms of procedural gamesmanship undertaken by plaintiffs).
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